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Abstract 
 
We develop a theoretical framework to examine three hypotheses on the relationship between 
HRM practices and organisational performance in European firms.  The first is that 
collaborative forms of HRM practice are more strongly associated with superior firm 
performance than calculative forms.  The second is that these associations are strongest where 
national institutional and normative settings support them.  The third is that employer-
employee consultative committees and collective payment methods are also associated with 
superior firm performance.  The first two propositions are strongly empirically supported, as 
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Human Resource Management and Performance in European Firms 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper tests how far collaborative types of human resource management (HRM) practices, 
including group-based forms, are associated with improved firm performance in European 
countries.  Many previous studies have attempted to establish a link between HRM practices 
and profitability, but these have been criticised for omitting employee relations variables 
(Wright and Haggerty, 2005).  We examine two types of HRM practices, characterised by 
their approaches to employer-employee relations as defined by Gooderham et al. (1999) to 
establish how effective each type is in enhancing organisational performance in different 
national contexts.  These two forms - ‘collaborative’ and ‘calculative’ HRM - are essentially 
defined by the degree to which employee involvement and participation are emphasised.  We 
augment the analysis of collaborative practices with other indicators that explicitly consider 
the role of group practices and employee consultative committees.   
We theoretically elaborate and empirically test the proposition that collaborative 
forms of HRM practice are more likely to enhance the labour extraction process and firm 
performance than calculative alternatives.  For the empirical analysis we use Cranet, a large 
cross-country dataset providing HRM information at firm level.  Our focus is on European 
firms and our findings strongly support the proposition that in those countries where the 
institutional setting is most conducive, collaborative organisational level practices enhance 
the labour extraction process and lead to superior firm performance.  Calculative practices 
have a weaker impact on the labour extraction function and firm performance.   
The paper is organised as follows.  In the next section 2, we review literature on the 
link between HRM practices and firm performance and develop a theoretical framework to 
analyse relationships in different national institutional environments.  In our theoretical 
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framework we combine an institutional approach with the neoclassical notion of the labour 
extraction function, which we use as an analytical tool.  We also derive hypotheses for 
relationships between HRM practices and institutional settings.  In section 3, we describe the 
data used and the scaling procedures employed in order to create measures of HRM practice 
and performance.  We then test our propositions empirically and discuss the results in section 
4.  Conclusions are drawn in section 5, where we discuss the theoretical and policy 
implications of our findings.  
 
2 HRM practices, institutional setting and firm performance 
Some forms of HRM emphasise collaboration between employees and employers and others 
do not (Gooderham et al., 1999).  Gooderham et al. (1999: 510) argue that HRM contains an 
‘inherent duality’ between ‘strong economic calculative considerations and ….. a more 
humanistic orientation’ and therefore distinguish two types of practice: ‘collaborative’ and 
‘calculative’, structured by both agency and institutional settings in different countries.  The 
indicators of the two forms that they develop are shown in Figure 1 below: 
- Figure 1 about here - 
In the spirit of Bowles (1985), Gordon (1994), and Osterman (1994) we view HRM as 
an instrument designed to enhance the labour extraction process and thus improve firm 
performance.  A convenient analytical tool characterising the labour extraction process is the 
labour extraction function, which represents the amount of labour supplied per hour of labour 
hired as a function of the costly inputs used to elicit work from employees.1  Our first 
argument is that the labour extraction function should be viewed as endogenously determined 
by the interaction of institutional environments and firm-specific HRM practices (e.g., 
Bowles, 1985).  Our second argument, pursued in parallel with the first, is that collaborative 
forms of HRM are more likely to enhance the labour extraction process and bring improved 
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performance than calculative alternatives (e.g., Levine and D’Andrea Tyson, 1990).  Thirdly, 
as Gooderham et al. (1999) argue, the different forms of HRM are likely to be differentially 
supported by different institutional frameworks.  
There have been many attempts, especially by American authors, to link HRM 
practices in general and firm performance; we make no attempt to review them all here (for 
critical reviews, see Guest et al., 2003 and Wright and Haggerty, 2005).  Early studies tended 
to link single HRM practices to outcomes (see, for example, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1991).  
Later studies, inspired by the ‘High Performance Work Systems’ (HPWS) paradigm 
identified groups of practices that were linked with superior organisational performance 
(Huselid, 1995; Becker and Gerhart, 1996; Appelbaum et al, 2000).  However, there have 
also been empirical studies yielding negative results (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001) and the 
HPWS school of thought has been criticised for failing to recognise that conflicts in the 
employment relationships are likely to limit HRM effectiveness (Godard, 2004).  Godard’s 
(2004) criticism is consistent with that made of the HPWS literature by Wright and Haggerty 
(2005) who argue that there are missing variables in the discussion (those normally used are 
typically pay linked to productivity and promotion possibilities).  The missing variables are 
those linked both to employee relations broadly conceived and those relating to collaborative, 
trust-building practices.  We therefore adopt a method that meets these criticisms by testing 
the links between two types of HRM encapsulating two different employee-employer 
relations paradigms and firm performance.  These variables are particularly relevant in 
Europe, where employment relationships (even in the UK) are characterised by a relatively 
strong collective dimension in comparison to the USA (Hall and Gingerich, 2005).   
An alternative, less satisfactory, framework for analysing the link between labour use 
and organisational performance is that of neoclassical efficiency-wage theory.  The theory 
treats workers’ motivation as exogenous to the firm and the industrial relations system (note 
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that employee motivation is assumed to depend solely on the real wage rate, directly affecting 
the cost of job loss, and the intensity of monitoring).  Yet, from the lack of trade-off between 
wages and monitoring shown in studies of ‘high and low trust’ national groupings, it follows 
that employees’ motivation must be treated as endogenous to the nature of labour–
management relations (Gordon, 1994; Naastepad and Storm, 2006).   
There are other aspects of the labour extraction function (which may not be directly 
driven by HRM practices) that are, by and large, indicators of high-trust relations.  A 
minimum degree of co-operation is a necessary condition of production, but the level of co-
operation may be raised if trust is at a high level (Akerlof, 1982).  Trust, defined as the 
supposition by each side that the other will act benevolently, is more fragile and conditional 
on the perceived solidity of institutional guarantees (Creed and Miles, 1996; Hoff, 2002).  
Levels of trust may show some consistency across organisations, but are also likely to vary 
between different work and occupational groups, and employee strata; the difference between 
different employee strata is reflected in the Gooderham et al. (1999) indicators.   
As Buchele and Christiansen (1999, p. 91) argue, continuous improvements in 
productivity depend not on individual efforts, but on the effective interaction among workers, 
among work groups or departments (coordination), and between management and workers 
(cooperation).  Baldamus (1961) suggested that effort cannot be measured, and therefore 
management monitoring of employees had to be subordinated to motivational methods; the 
extent to which employee ideas of trust were influenced by management were of vital 
importance to superior company performance.  Because no contract can be complete, a 
degree of control will always remain with employees, necessitating management efforts to 
build trust, reflected in efforts to influence employees’ underlying emotions (Baldamus 1961, 
p.41).   
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Akerlof (1982) similarly shows that individuals’ productive behaviour is determined 
by the social definition of the situation adopted by the relevant workers.  Akerlof (1982) 
focuses on the implicit gift-exchange nature of employment arrangements, where exchange is 
based on reciprocity and trust and relations are endogenously determined.2  Management has 
to make constant efforts to influence these norms (MacInnes et al., 1985).  Further, 
employees’ willingness to give up the protection offered by rigid work rules, disclose their 
proprietary (tacit) knowledge, and initiate changes in the production process that raise labour 
productivity and the firm’s capacity for innovation, depends, to a large extent, on 
management committing to ‘high-trust’ work practices (Buchele and Christiansen, 1999; 
Naastepad and Storm, 2006).  The (Taylorist) alternative is high levels of employee 
monitoring, which threaten to undermine trust.  The implication is that cooperative and 
group-based HRM practices with strong implicit gift exchanges will tend to enhance firm 
performance.   
Thus, the calculative-collaborative distinction is useful but should be supplemented to 
capture high-trust relations in the collaborative form.  The Gooderham et al. (1999) 
framework stresses communications practices in the collaborative form of HRM.  While 
these are revealing of the degree to which employer communications to all grades of 
employee are viewed as significant by the company, they do not show how far employee 
views are sought through consultative mechanisms, nor how worker collectives are reinforced 
by group-payment systems.  We therefore incorporate two further indicators: one showing the 
extent of collective consultative practices and the second the extent of group-payment 
systems.   
Trust is likely to be further built by collective consultative mechanisms that, again 
allowing for degrees of variation between them, give employees an opportunity for ‘voice’.  
These mechanisms afford a degree of protection to individuals exercising voice.  The 
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collective provides support, encouragement and some protection to individual workers via its 
capacity to take sanctions against those threatening its members (Brewster et al., 2007).   
Finally, group-payment systems in general also tend to increase workers decision-
making latitude and to reinforce employee collectives in relation to management. They are 
therefore viewed negatively by ‘calculative’ forms of HRM which stress individual rewards 
for individual effort (Legge, 1995).  Group-payment systems are closely associated with 
teamworking (Tzafrir, 2005).  The formal institution of teamwork by management may both 
reflect and entail different degrees of delegation and therefore trust to the teams, but the very 
fact of their institution by management requires a certain minimum level of trust (Tzafrir, 
2005).  Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) and Tzafrir (2005) show that despite considerable 
variation, high-trust relations between management and employees are associated with team 
working and especially with its more autonomous forms.  While teamwork takes a wide 
range of forms and also varies greatly in the extent of delegation of decision-taking to 
employees, group-payment systems invariably underpin the collectives’ identity in relation to 
management (Tzafrir, 2005).  We therefore measure the extent of the group-payment systems 
rather than the existence of teamwork.    
Different national institutional frameworks support different approaches to the labour 
extraction function.  The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature has different variants, 
categorising countries and grouping them by ‘variety’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or ‘business 
system’ (Whitley, 1999).  In the broadest terms, the USA, Britain and Ireland are invariably 
put into one category (‘compartmentalised’ [Whitley, 1999] or ‘Liberal Market Economies 
(LME)’ [Hall and Soskice, 2001]) and those of Western Europe into another (‘collaborative’ 
[Whitley, 1999] or ‘Co-ordinated Market Economies (CME)’ [Hall and Soskice, 2001]).  The 
extent to which institutional complementarities within systems help develop high-trust 
relations at the organisational level is a defining characteristic of national systems (Whitley, 
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1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003).  Whitley (1999) places particular emphasis on 
the importance of co-operation between employers and employees, as demonstrated in the 
analytical significance of his ‘employer-employee interdependence’ concept, described as the 
degree to which both parties are willing to invest in each other.  The implication is that where 
interdependence is encouraged by the systemic institutional context and is relatively well-
developed, this will in turn raise levels of mutual investment and efficiency, productivity and 
quality.  Systemic features in the economies categorised by Whitley (1999) as ‘collaborative’ 
serve to support the development of high-trust relations, and the converse is also true for his 
‘compartmentalised’ (broadly equivalent to the ‘low trust’ or LME) category (Harcourt and 
Wood, 2007).   
Let us take one illustrative example of the processes at work, the links between skilled 
workers and their employers, through the contrast between the German and British situations.  
Part of the contrast rests on the difference between the two Vocational, Educational and 
Training (VET) systems.  In Germany, VET standards are determined by employers’ 
associations and unions acting under the co-ordination of the state body, the Bundesinstitut 
für Berufliche Bildung and therefore the employee collectives are recognised as partners.  
Legislative and union pressures via the rights accorded to works councils also limit the 
capacity of employers to shed skilled labour in this system.  In Britain, VET standards (in the 
majority of industries) are not determined by such co-operative processes, and skilled 
workers are less likely to be retained because of the lack of legislative and union pressures to 
do so.  Moreover, short-term financial pressures from stock markets are more likely to 
exercise an influence over labour shedding in the British case than in the German (Whitley, 
1999).  
However, national systems do not determine HRM practices.  At firm level, systemic 
options present managements, even in highly co-ordinated systems such as the German, with 
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considerable room for practices that differ from the clusters of ideal firm types specified by 
Whitley (Singe and Croucher, 2005).  ‘High-trust’ HRM practices may also be attempted in 
low trust economies with varying degrees of success (Danford et al., 2005), and may be more 
supported by legal and institutional arrangements in ‘low-trust’ economies than sometimes 
recognised, as UK case studies have indicated (Deakin et al. 2006).  On the other hand, 
perceived breaches of trust by managements in “high-trust” countries (characterized by low 
monitoring intensity and high real wage growth), may also occur.  In these countries, an 
increase in monitoring intensity, ceteris paribus, may cause reduced employees’ effort and 
productivity (Drago and Perlman, 1989; Naastepad and Storm, 2006).   
 
Hypotheses  
In summary, our hypotheses about the optimality of HRM practices and their 
synergies within various institutional settings are as follows:  
H1: Collaborative forms of HRM practice are more strongly associated with superior 
firm performance than calculative forms; 
H2: These associations are strongest where national institutional and normative 
settings support them; 
H3: Employer-employee consultative committees and collective payment methods are 
associated with superior firm performance.  
 
3 Data and variables 
In the following sections we econometrically test the hypotheses derived from our theoretical 
analysis.  Data used for the tests are extracted from CRANET, an international survey of 
HRM practices conducted at regular intervals since 1989.  The most senior HRM manager in 
each firm is asked a comprehensive set of questions about the firm and its HRM practices.  
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Our data are derived from the 1999/2000 round of surveys, while the study by Gooderham et 
al. (1999) which we extend uses the previous round of surveys in 1995/1996.  Full technical 
details of the survey are provided in Tregaskis et al. (2004).   
Since a central issue in our analysis is the importance of institutional factors and 
organisational practices for the labour extraction function, and thus for firm performance, we 
use data from several countries exhibiting diverse institutional settings and diverse HRM 
practices.  Following this line of reasoning we also control for and compare results from 
samples with and without firms that are foreign subsidiaries.3  The rationale is that such 
firms’ HRM practices may have been at least influenced by different country-of–origin 
institutional environments albeit in a complex way as argued by Gooderham et al. (1998).   
The main dependent variable in our analysis is firm performance (perf) measured as a 
composite index comprised of five partial measures: service quality, level of productivity, 
profitability, product to market time, and rate of innovation.  Each partial measure is an 
ordinal categorical variable.4  We apply Mokken’s nonparametric scaling approach to 
produce our synthetic performance measure (Mokken and Lewis, 1982).  The unweighted 
sum of item scores has to be monotonously related to the latent true scores as demonstrated 
by Sjitsma et al. (1990).  This implies that Mokken’s model provides estimates of the scale 
scores only at ordinal level.  As in other studies, the primary scaling criterion is Loevinger’s 
H-coefficient of homogeneity.  A set of items constitutes a scale if the total scale has a H-
value exceeding 0.30; values above 0.50 indicate strong scales.  The details of the items 
included in the performance scale, results of the scaling procedure, and reliability analysis are 
reported in Table 1.   
- Table 1 about here - 
Furthermore, for the impact of work organisation on firm performance Levine and 
D’Andrea Tyson (1990), amongst others, report that substantial shop floor participation leads 
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to some combination of an increase in satisfaction, commitment, quality, and productivity, 
and a reduction in labour turnover and absenteeism.  Therefore, we further extend our 
analysis of performance by relating labour extraction measures: absenteeism (abse) and 
turnover (turn) to various factors affecting the extraction function.  Low turnover has been 
shown to have a considerable affect on the effectiveness of HPWSs in generating improved 
results in the US context (Guthrie et al., 2004).  Absenteeism is measured as average days per 
employee per year.  Turnover is the annual staff turnover in percent.  Both measures of labour 
extraction are approximate and are affected by various economic and institutional country-
specific factors in addition to the main determinants of the labour extraction function.  With 
this caveat, linking absenteeism and turnover to HRM practices in regressions where major 
economic and institutional factors are controlled for represents a useful empirical 
representation of our theoretical framework. 
Next, to formulate measures of the HRM practices within firms that approximate 
aspects of institutional environment at firm level as well, we refer to the strategic HRM 
model following Gooderham et al. (1999).  They identify two types of practices: calculative 
(calc) and collaborative (coll) HRM.  Subsumed under the former are practices that aim at 
securing a fit between strategy and human resources, while the latter category captures 
practices designed to enhance mutuality, consensus and trust.   
The calculative approach aims at ensuring that production activities are at all times 
efficiently (which in this context implies profitably) supplied with the necessary input of 
human resources (including monitoring personnel).  Associated with this model are a range of 
efficiency-seeking devices aimed at ensuring that each employee’s contribution to the firm is 
assessed and thereafter rewarded accordingly through performance appraisals and 
individually oriented reward systems.  Investment in employee development is also carefully 
monitored to evaluate its benefits for the business strategy.  Importantly, any such calculative 
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approach is dependent upon the feasibility of treating each employee as an individual rather 
than as a member of a collective entity protected by collective bargained contracts and unions.  
Furthermore, if calculative practices are adopted it is reasonable to expect that management 
will possess substantial autonomy within the firm.  Such autonomy will require power not be 
curtailed by strong regulative pressure at firm level by law and norms nor by influential 
unions.   
The collaborative approach has a distinctly more developmental and humanistic focus 
often expressed in explicit statements about the value of the employees to the firm.  
Employees are viewed as active partners and core assets, including in terms of creativity and 
innovation.  The collaborative emphasis is characterised by efforts to create and communicate 
a culture of partnership between employer and employees as well as among employees.  
Management attempts to formulate a strategic direction communicated to the firm’s 
employees in the form of mission, goals, or strategy statements via an explicit employee 
communication policy.  Sources of collaborative practices can be found in the support of 
unions or other collective bodies representing employee interests.  Furthermore, the 
introduction of collaborative practices is highly dependent on the degree of autonomous 
action enjoyed by HRM departments.  A minimum amount of freedom of action is necessary 
if there is to be sufficient space for a communicative style of operation of the HRM function.  
Clearly, strong nationally-specific influences will be present.   
The two HRM approaches considered characterise, in general, two distinct forms of 
labour extraction as discussed above although as asserted by Harrison (1993), the two types 
of practices should not be conceived of as representing two ends of a continuum but should 
rather be viewed as orthogonal.  Gooderham et al. (1999) demonstrate that the two sets of 
practices may be clearly differentiated in this way whilst acknowledging that elements of 
both may be present in organisations.  A key reason for this, in international terms, is that the 
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specific management practices are supported or undermined by institutional constraints in 
different countries, a point that Gooderham and Nordhaug (2003) elaborate in later work.  In 
our empirical analysis we test for the relationship between calculative and collaborative 
practices and their joint impact on performance.   
Next, we extend the Gooderham et al. (1999) HRM typology with a third measure 
explicitly reflecting the existence of joint consultative committees and group payment 
systems, which we designate group-based practices (grpr).  In this index we include features 
at firm level reflecting the existence of joint employee consultative committees and profit-
sharing schemes applied to different segments of the labour force.  We expect that the index 
will capture some aspects of the impact of Akerlof’s (1982) implicit gift exchange 
mechanism on labour extraction and ultimately on firm performance. 
To develop measures for HRM practices, we use Mokken’s nonparametric latent trial 
model for unidimensional scaling (Mokken and Lewis, 1982).  Thus, we follow the 
methodology used by Gooderham et al. (1999) which allows us to compare the measures of 
interest estimated with data from two consecutive rounds of surveys.  Mokken’s approach 
does not make overly restrictive assumptions and provides an internal scaling criterion that 
ensures a unidimensional scale.  This is an important advantage in this case where 
dichotomous items are used and do not satisfy the assumption of interval scale items.  Details 
of the items included in the scales, results of the scaling procedure, and reliability analysis are 
reported in Table 1.   
Besides variables related to HRM practices, the determinants of the labour extraction 
function - cost of job loss at firm level (w) and intensity of monitoring (s) – are the main 
variables in our performance regression specifications.  The w variable is measured as the 
percentage of labour cost in the operating costs which when controlled for firm size and 
external market conditions (see below) would approximate to the potential cost of job loss at 
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firm level.  The s variable is measured by the proportion of the firm’s employees that are 
managers.  In the Cranet dataset there are three other categories of employees reported: 
manual, clerical and professional (technical) employees.  As Gordon (1994) argues, the 
proportion of managers in the firm’s employment approximates to the intensity of monitoring.   
Finally, we control for several other firm characteristics affecting performance.  These 
are log of firm size (lfsize), log of firm age (lfage), and two qualitative characteristics of the 
labour force - a dummy variable indicating employees 45 years of age or older (eage45) and a 
dummy variable indicating employees with at least higher education (eedugr).  Market 
conditions are controlled for by a three-step ordinal scale (market) indicating whether the 
firm’s market is booming, steady or stagnating.  Industrial sector information – a set of 
industry dummy variables - is included in all regression specifications (except the base one).  
In all regressions a control dummy variable for foreign-subsidiary status of firms is also 
included.  Country dummy variables are used in all extended regression specifications to 
control for important variations in institutional settings.  In selected specifications cross-
effects of the country dummies and HRM variables of interest are also included.  Summary 
statistics and short definitions of all regression variables are reported in Table 2.5  
- Table 2 about here - 
 
4 Estimation results 
We estimate three sets of OLS regressions.  First, we estimate a set of equations where firm 
performance is directly linked to the HRM variables of interest while controlling for 
institutional context and several other important determinants of performance such as firm 
size and age, qualitative characteristics of the labour force, market conditions, and industry 
specificity.  The results of this analysis are reported in Tables 3a and 3b.  We start with a base 
specification where only variables corresponding to the neoclassical efficiency-wage model 
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are included.  Then we extend the specification by introducing a richer set of controls and 
HRM practices variables.  Second, we consider a direct empirical approximation of the 
labour extraction function, using two dependent variables, labour force turnover and 
absenteeism.  We extend the specifications in a manner similar to the performance 
regressions.  The results are reported in Table 4a and Table 4b, respectively.6   
- Table 3a about here - 
Tables 3a and 3b contain several significant general findings.  The HRM variables 
have positive and, in general, statistically significant impacts on firm performance.  When the 
HRM variables are interacted with country dummies (Table 3b), thus controlling for the 
specific link between HRM practices and countries’ institutional settings, we find differential 
effects of the variables of interest on firm performance.  Overall, the effect of collaborative 
practices is positive and significant in countries that fall in the ‘high trust’ category.  The 
group-based-practices variable significantly impacts performance of firms in both ‘low trust’ 
and ‘intermediate’ categories of countries.  In most countries it seems that the different types 
of HRM practices coexist; however, there usually is one dominant (or more important) type 
of practice affecting firm performance.   
- Table 3b about here - 
Thus, the results related to the interaction between HRM practices and country-
specific (institutional) conditions are of particular interest.  Specifically, Table 3b shows that 
calculative practices affect performance positively (but not statistically significantly) in most 
countries analysed, compared to the reference country (the UK).  The only country where 
calculative practices have a negative and statistically significant impact on performance is 
Denmark.  This may be caused by the very specific evolution of Danish industrial relations 
(Due et al., 1994).  Collaborative practices seem to have stronger economic and statistically 
significant positive impacts on performance in several countries variously categorised in VoC 
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literature as ‘co-operative’, ‘co-ordinated’ and so on.  These are France, Germany, Sweden, 
Denmark, Belgium and Spain.  With respect to group-based practices, UK firms appear to 
perform well as only firms in France outperform British firms.  Group-based practices also 
have a positive but not statistically significant impact on performance in several other ‘co-
operative’ or ‘co-ordinated’ countries.   
The results in Table 4a and Table 4b confirm our main findings as the largest impact 
derives from collaborative and group-based practices.  Absenteeism (Table 4a) is lower in 
firms that employ any of the three types of practices, controlling for industry and country 
effects.  Turnover (Table 4b) is also minimised by applying HRM practices.  These results 
suggest that the labour extraction function is improved by systematic application of HRM 
practices at firm level.  It is evident that collaborative and group-based practices have a 
stronger impact in both sets of regressions.  When the link between HRM practices and 
country-specific institutions is explored, we again find differential effects across countries 
and types of practice, in line with the different institutional contexts.  These findings confirm 
our proposition that the labour extraction function should be viewed as endogenously 
determined by the interaction of the institutional environment and firm-specific HRM 
practices rather than as simply an exogenous trade-off between wages and monitoring as  
neoclassical efficiency-wage theory asserts.   
- Table 4a about here - 
Specifically, in Table 4a, column (4), the interaction terms of collaborative practices 
measure are negative for all countries and are statistically significant for Germany, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Austria.  This suggests that collaborative practices improve labour extraction 
in every country.  However, the impact is strongest in the four countries mentioned.  The 
relationships depicted by the interaction terms of group-based practices measure are also 
negative everywhere, implying less absenteeism, except in Spain where the coefficient is 
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positive but statistically insignificant.  Interestingly, the impact of group-based practices on 
absenteeism is most statistically significant in the Scandinavian countries.   
- Table 4b about here - 
The results in Table 4b, column (4) where the dependent variable is employee 
turnover also support the general proposition that both collaborative and group-based HRM 
practices positively impact the labour extraction process.  It is important to note, however, 
that when the cross effects of calculative practices measure are considered, for several 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Austria and Belgium) the effects are positive, suggesting that 
there is more employee turnover in firms that use calculative HRM practices.  The results for 
the cross effects of collaborative practices measure are the opposite and show that the impact 
on labour extraction is positive (as demonstrated by low turnover) in all countries as the 
effect is statistically significant in France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.  The 
results for cross effects of group-based practices measure are mixed as the labour extraction 
function appears to be adversely (high turnover) and statistically significantly affected in 
Spain and Ireland.   
 
5 Conclusion and discussion 
This paper has tested the theoretically derived hypothesis (H1) that collaborative forms of 
HRM practice are more likely to enhance the labour extraction process and firm performance 
than calculative alternatives.  The proposition was strongly supported in those countries 
where the institutional setting was most conducive to these organisational level practices (H2), 
which are essentially related to strong communication with employees.  The countries 
concerned are the strongest versions of the ‘Co-ordinated Market Economies’ of Western 
Europe.  This supplements and is consistent with other studies’ findings in relation to forms 
of employee voice.  Within these CME contexts, different forms of voice are encouraged by 
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the institutional framework and therefore coexist, mutually reinforcing each other, optimizing 
employee wages and working conditions, productivity and organizational performance 
(Hubler and Jirjahn, 2003).  In the UK context, inherent tensions between different forms of 
practice exist, with particularly strong pressures towards individualization and direct forms of 
expression (Bryson, 2004).  
Calculative practices had a weaker impact on the labour extraction function and firm 
performance.  In the case of Denmark, where calculative practices existed, these were 
negatively associated with performance, absenteeism and turnover.  Denmark has an 
institutional framework providing especially strong support for collaborative practices, and 
has been categorised as an unambiguously ‘Co-ordinated Market Economy’ (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Hall and Gingerich, 2005).  It is distinctive within the CME category for its 
high degree of employer-union consensual decision taking, requiring relatively little state 
intervention for its maintenance (Due et al., 1994; 2000). This suggests that in a country with 
an especially strong institutional and normative disposition towards collaborative practices, 
the contrast between calculative practices and these contextual factors is so acute as to 
generate a counterproductive employee reaction and weaker firm performance.   
We also tested the hypothesis (H3) that group-based practices might also generate 
improved employee-employer relationships and performance.  The findings here are more 
mixed, but confirm and extend contextual analyses such as the analysis of the German case 
(Addison et al., 2004; Singe and Croucher, 2005).  Other strongly collaborative national 
contexts have been found to give similar results.  The mixed nature of findings concerning 
group-based practices is to be expected given the wide range of contents to be found in these 
practices.  They also interact with other arrangements; their effectiveness is conditional on a 
wide range of factors, including how they are combined with other complementary 
approaches such as quality circles (Becker and Gerhart, 1996).  Group-based practices were 
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expected to give positive results in countries where they were strongly supported by the 
context and again, this was the case.  In Sweden, such practices had a strong effect on 
absenteeism in relation to the UK reference group, possibly because of their content but 
equally possibly because of the way that they act in line with the particularly strong 
collaborative institutional framework (Whitley, 1999).    
The limitations of this study are firstly that employee attitudes have not been directly 
tested and secondly that self-reported (subjective) measures of all the indicators are used.  In 
the latter case, it would have been ideal to combine these with more objective measures as 
recommended by Wall et al. (2004).  No international dataset at organisational level currently 
allows this, but future research could usefully address both of these limitations.  In the first 
case, that of employee attitudes, there is a particular need not only to approach the issue by 
survey data but also to combine survey data with other data (which might helpfully be 
observationally-derived) that could demonstrate the mechanisms at work at organisational 
level.   
Nevertheless, our findings have significant policy implications and consequences for 
political economy.  First, they provide underpinning for the ‘CME’ concept itself, which has 
been criticised for a lack of differentiation (Allen, 2004), but which in respect of the 
employment practice-performance link appears to have some justification.  On the other hand, 
this finding has a second consequence for the significance of the Varieties of Capitalism 
conceptualisation. Central to the ‘VoC’ formulation in its original form is the argument that 
particular national institutional configurations cannot be considered ‘superior’ to others.  
Rather, it is a question of the ‘fit’ between labour market practices, the mode of production 
(‘Fordist’ or ‘flexible specialisation’) at organisational level and the requirements of the 
markets being sold into that determine success in specific markets (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
Becker (2007) has criticised the theory, suggesting that practices may be quite different from 
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those envisaged by Hall and Soskice, but may nevertheless be ‘equi-functional’.  In this view, 
LMEs can perform as well as CMEs even in ‘flexible specialisation’ types of production if 
companies adopt ‘equi-functional’ practices.  In short, companies operating in LMEs can 
succeed even in markets demanding high quality where they compensate for a lack of 
contextual support.   
Our findings demonstrate that the CME model is superior in supporting productive 
efficiency at the organisational level.  This is consistent with Panic (2007), who demonstrates 
that there are no macro-economic performance grounds for ‘liberalising’ European 
economies since the Scandinavian economies have performed comparatively well, especially 
in relation to LMEs.  Our evidence supplements his by showing that the ways that CMEs 
encourage company level communications appear central to raising efficiency.  All of this 
supports the EU policy of attempting to extend industrial communications policies across the 
EU, including to the LMEs (Britain and Ireland) and the new entrant countries via such 
measures as the Information and Consultation Directive.  It also tends to support an argument 
that the weak transposition of the Directive into English law is inadequate and unlikely to 
foster the diffusion of collaborative practices (Hall, 2005).   
Our findings are clearly supportive of the European ‘social model’.  It was noted 
nearly a decade ago that the benefits of a more collaborative approach were increasingly 
being framed in economic rather than democratic terms within Europe (Martens, 1999).  This 
tendency has since gathered pace. In the German case, arguably at the centre of the European 
model, this is reflected in a political consensus that aspects of ‘liberalisation’ are required 
(Lane, 2000; 2003).  This has been rejected by others (see for example Panic, 2007).  At the 
European level, it has been argued that the European Employment Strategy, now in place for 
over ten years, threatens to crowd out the EU’s more traditional rights-based approach to 
employment regulation in the name of job creation (Fredman, 2006).  It is therefore important 
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to note that the efficiency benefits of the more collaborative practices encouraged by rights-
based approaches that we have shown are inextricably linked to the benefits that employees 
feel from them (Akerlof, 1982).  In short, the emphasis on job creation should not crowd out 
the traditional emphasis on employment rights that supports the European social model.   
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Footnotes 
1. Neoclassical economic theory points to two types of inputs in the labour extraction 
function - monitoring cost and higher (efficiency) wages leading to higher expected income 
losses if an employee is fired.  For a formalised application of the labour extraction function 
to an analysis of implications of HRM practices and the institutional context for firm 
performance refer to Rizov and Croucher (2007). 
2. More specifically, Akerlof’s (1982) model posits that monitoring is performed by 
employee groups.  Excess remuneration to some members of the employee group and 
leniency of work rules constitute the major gifts by the employer to employees.  Employees’ 
gift to the employer - effort in excess of formal work standards - is linked to the employer’s 
gift to employees.  The key assumption in this mechanism is reciprocity as a major feature of 
gift exchange, as well as of market exchange.  In gift exchanges, however, effort norms are 
established according to the ‘fair day’s work’ concept rather than by market forces.  In return 
employees expect to be treated fairly by the employer.  The concept of fair treatment is not 
based on absolute standards, but rather, on comparisons of one’s own situation with that of 
other individuals.  Individuals use comparison with others as a guide to how they ought to 
behave or how they ought to be treated.   
3. We report here results from the full sample with a control for foreign subsidiary status 
which does not appear to be statistically significant in any specification.  Using Wald tests of 
differences between coefficients estimated from the full and the restricted sample shows that 
the coefficients do not differ significantly.   
4. We recognise a potential bias in the construction of the dependent variable.  The dependent 
variable is a composite index of five measures, including service quality and innovation.  
Arguably, it might favour a collaborative view, since service quality and innovation are, 
theoretically both, when effective, dependent upon collaborative processes.  In order to 
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investigate the issue empirically, we ran regressions with only narrowly defined, and neutral 
to HRM, measures of performance, specifically, level of productivity and profitability.  The 
results of these regressions are qualitatively very similar to the results reported in the paper 
suggesting that the formulation of the dependent variable as a composite index does not bias 
our main findings.  The auxiliary regression results are available from the authors upon 
request.  
5. In all regressions we have included as controls for measurement error, due to self-reporting, 
variables describing important characteristics of individuals that filled out the questionnaires.  
These individual-level control variables are gender, education, years of service in the 
organization and we assume that they are not correlated with the firm-level variables.   
6. All regressions contain a dummy variable controlling for the foreign-subsidiary status of 
firms, and individual-reporter controls which were all found not to be statistically significant 
in any regression and therefore their coefficients were not reported.  The stability of 
coefficients in all regressions when introducing stepwise explanatory variables suggests 
minimal problems with endogeneity.   
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Figure 1 Calculative and Collaborative HRM practices 
Calculative:  
Individual and formal 
Collaborative: 
Mission, briefings, communication 
Individual performance appraisals for 
managers 
Written mission statement 
Individual performance appraisals for 
professional/technical staff 
Formal briefings about company strategy for 
managers  
Individual performance appraisals for 
clerical staff 
Formal briefings about company strategy for 
professional/technical staff 
Individual performance appraisals for 
manual staff 
Formal briefings about company strategy for 
clerical staff 
Individual reward systems (merit pay and 
performance related pay) for managers 
Formal briefings about company strategy for 
manual staff 
Individual reward systems (merit pay and 
performance related pay) for 
professional/technical staff 
Written communication policy with 
employees 
Individual reward systems (merit pay and 
performance related pay) for clerical staff 
 
Individual reward systems (merit pay and 
performance related pay) for manual staff 
 
Formal evaluation of personnel training 
immediately after training 
 
Formal evaluation of training some months 
later 
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Table 1 Performance and HRM practices scales 
Scale/Variable MSP Alpha  
 Mean H   
Performance scale (perf) - 0.45 0.76  
Profitability between 3 and 1 (high-low) 2.13 0.43 0.71  
Productivity between 3 and 1 (high-low) 2.21 0.49 0.69  
Service quality between 3 and 1 (high-low) 2.45 0.44 0.74  
Product to market between 3 and 1 (high-low) 2.06 0.50 0.68  
Innovation between 3 and 1 (high-low) 2.10 0.40 0.73  
Calculative scale (calc) - 0.64 0.71  
Individual rewards: manual 0.15 0.84 0.69  
Individual rewards: clerical 0.28 0.87 0.68  
Individual rewards: professionals 0.41 0.87 0.69  
Individual rewards: managers 0.66 0.82 0.71  
Performance appraisal: manual 0.47 0.46 0.68  
Performance appraisal: clerical 0.60 0.62 0.65  
Performance appraisal: professionals 0.65 0.66 0.65  
Performance appraisal: managers 0.67 0.56 0.67  
Formal evaluation: immediate 0.52 0.36 0.70  
Formal evaluation: later 0.32 0.43 0.71  
Collaborative scale (coll) - 0.63 0.70  
Strategy briefings: manual 0.36 0.88 0.57  
Strategy briefings: clerical 0.47 0.84 0.54  
Strategy briefings: professionals 0.62 0.76 0.59  
Strategy briefings: managers 0.96 0.67 0.71  
Written mission statement 0.80 0.36 0.71  
Communication policy 0.77 0.30 0.73  
Group-practices scale (grpr) - 0.57 0.71  
Joint consultative committee 0.56 0.30 0.75  
Employee share options: manual 0.15 0.56 0.68  
Employee share options: clerical 0.16 0.53 0.68  
Employee share options: professionals 0.19 0.49 0.68  
Profit sharing: manual 0.20 0.58 0.66  
Profit sharing: clerical 0.24 0.63 0.66  
Profit sharing: professionals 0.29 0.65 0.66  
Group bonus: manual 0.21 0.61 0.70  
Group bonus: clerical 0.20 0.66 0.69  
Group bonus: professionals 0.21 0.68 0.69  
Notes: MSP denotes Mokken Scaling Program.  H is Loevinger’s coefficient of homogeneity 
(weighted); all H-coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level.  Alpha 
is Cronbach’s alpha measure of reliability.   
 31
Table 2 Summary statistics of regression variables 
Variable Description Mean S.d. 
perf Performance composite index ranging 
between 5 and 15 (low-high) 
10.97 2.30 
absc Average number of days of absence per 
employee per year 
7.95 6.52 
turn Employee turnover at firm level in percent 
per year 
8.24 10.58 
w Percentage of labour cost in total operating 
cost 
38.98 21.36 
s Ratio of managers to employees in percent 9.10 9.20 
lfsize Log of firm size (total labour force) 6.05 1.20 
lfage Log of firm age (years) 3.66 0.91 
eage45 Percentage of labour force 45 years of age or 
older 
32.87 18.76 
eedugr Percentage of labour force with graduate or 
post-graduate education 
23.11 16.77 
market Index of market conditions and business 
cycle development ranging between 1 and 3 
(recession-expansion) 
1.61 0.70 
calc Calculative HRM composite index ranging 
between 0 and 10 
4.65 2.23 
coll Collaborative HRM composite index 
ranging between 0 and 6 
3.97 1.62 
grpr Group-based HRM composite index ranging 
between 0 and 10 
4.24 2.05 
Manufacturing Manufacturing industries dummy variable 0.50 0.79 
Construction Construction industries dummy variable 0.04 0.20 
Transportation Transportation industries dummy variable 0.06 0.24 
Bank and finance Banking and finance services industries 
dummy variable 
0.09 0.29 
Personal services Personal services industries dummy variable 0.01 0.11 
Other industries Other industries dummy variable 0.30 0.46 
Foreign subsidiary Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is a 
foreign subsidiary and 0 otherwise 
0.30 0.46 
UK UK dummy variable 0.14 0.34 
France France dummy variable 0.08 0.26 
Germany Germany dummy variable 0.15 0.35 
Sweden Sweden dummy variable 0.04 0.21 
Spain Spain dummy variable 0.06 0.23 
Denmark Denmark dummy variable 0.08 0.27 
Norway Norway dummy variable 0.13 0.34 
Ireland Ireland dummy variable 0.11 0.31 
Finland Finland dummy variable 0.11 0.31 
Austria Austria dummy variable 0.05 0.23 
Belgium Belgium dummy variable 0.05 0.22 
Note: Number of observations used in calculating summary statistics is 1045 except for absc 
and turn where number of observations is 779 and 965, respectively.  
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Table 3a Regression analysis of firm performance 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
w -0.019 (0.003) -0.018 (0.004) -0.017 (0.004) -0.015 (0.004) 
s 0.006 (0.008) 0.006 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009) 0.007 (0.009) 
lfsize 0.025 (0.059) 0.077 (0.064) 0.0049 (0.064) 0.016 (0.065) 
lfage -0.204 (0.082) -0.167 (0.084) -0.153 (0.084) -0.155 (0.084) 
eage45 -0.004 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) 
eedugr 0.004 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 
market 0.182 (0.102) 0.206 (0.103) 0.202 (0.103)  0.194 (0.102) 
calc - - 0.063 (0.032) 0.056 (0.032) 
coll - - 0.075 (0.045) 0.066 (0.047) 
grpr - - - 0.102 (0.039) 
Construction - 0.329 (0.361) 0.402 (0.361) 0.445 (0.360) 
Transportation - -0.187 (0.309) -0.129 (0.361) -0.080 (0.308) 
Bank and finance - -0.229 (0.274) -0.261 (0.273) -0.249 (0.272) 
Personal services - 0.455 (0.632) 0.427 (0.631) 0.436 (0.629) 
Other industries - -0.300 (0.182) -0.278 (0.182) -0.202 (0.184) 
France - -0.709 (0.360) -0.635 (0.328) -0.727 (0.338) 
Germany - 0.297 (0.272) 0.145 (0.277) 0.077 (0.277) 
Sweden - -0.500 (0.380) -0.581 (0.380) -0.526 (0.379) 
Spain - -0.260 (0.353) -0.158 (0.355) -0.188 (0.357) 
Denmark - 0.014 (0.322) 0.075 (0.324) 0.167 (0.325) 
Norway - -0.134 (0.279) -0.020 (0.285) -0.041 (0.285) 
Ireland - 0.023 (0.302) 0.087 (0.302) 0.158 (0.302) 
Finland - -0.001 (0.289) 0.036 (0.302) 0.063 (0.302) 
Austria - 0.802 (0.355) 0.885 (0.356) 0.943 (0.355) 
Belgium - 0.315 (0.364) 0.281 (0.363) 0.355 (0.364) 
Control for subsidiary Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for reporter Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2R  0.24 0.28 0.32 0.35 
Number observations 1045 1045 1045 1045 
Note: In the table each column shows coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.  
Coefficients in bold denote significance at 10% level or better.  Reference country is the UK 
and reference industry is manufacturing.  
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Table 3b Regression analysis of firm performance: cross effects 
Variable (5) (6)   
w -0.017 (0.004) -0.015 (0.004)   
s 0.005 (0.009) 0.004 (0.009)   
lfsize 0.057 (0.065) 0.047 (0.066)   
lfage -0.172 (0.085) -0.168 (0.085)   
eage45 -0.003 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004)   
eedugr 0.005 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003)   
market 0.198 (0.104) 0.199 (0.104)   
calc 0.032 (0.084) 0.032 (0.084)   
coll 0.030 (0.118) 0.040 (0.118)   
grpr - 0.111 (0.059)   
France -1.540 (1.036) -1.415 (1.127)   
Germany 0.981 (0.781) 1.063 (0.824)   
Sweden -0.968 (0.631) -1.046 (0.853)   
Spain -1.280 (1.080) -1.841 (1.117)   
Denmark -0.969 (0.992) -0.711 (0.914)   
Norway -0.796 (0.844) -0.773 (0.862)   
Ireland 0.576 (0.926) 0.796 (0.940)   
Finland 0.199 (0.994) 0.183 (0.901)   
Austria 0.610 (0.892) 0.482 (0.588)   
Belgium -0.693 (0.452) -0.572 (0.413)   
France*calc 0.031 (0.134) 0.036 (0.138)   
Germany*calc 0.166 (0.122) 0.163 (0.122)   
Sweden*calc 0.190 (0.189) 0.200 (0.188)   
Spain*calc 0.133 (0.176) 0.167 (0.178)   
Denmark*calc -0.410 (0.137) -0.314 (0.143)   
Norway*calc -0.046 (0.117) -0.052 (0.119)   
Ireland*calc -0.093 (0.129) -0.099 (0.130)   
Finland*calc 0.018 (0.126) 0.010 (0.126)   
Austria*calc 0.062 (0.156) 0.074 (0.155)   
Belgium*calc 0.096 (0.162) 0.064 (0.170)   
France*coll 0.291 (0.129) 0.322 (0.159)   
Germany*coll 0.201 (0.133) 0.203 (0.132)   
Sweden*coll 0.146 (0.083) 0.130 (0.083)   
Spain*coll 0.380 (0.224) 0.373 (0.223)   
Denmark*coll 0.272 (0.155) 0.269 (0.154)   
Norway*coll 0.172 (0.174) 0.154 (0.175)   
Ireland*coll -0.027 (0.180) -0.034 (0.184)   
Finland*coll -0.051 (0.193) -0.072 (0.194)   
Austria*coll 0.042 (0.158) -0.037 (0.157)   
Belgium*coll 0.334 (0.201) 0.328 (0.206)   
France*grpr - 0.226 (0.135)   
Germany*grpr - 0.081 (0.136)   
Sweden*grpr - -0.012 (0.165)   
Spain*grpr - 0.289 (0.225)   
Denmark*grpr - -0.196 (0.219)   
Norway*grpr - -0.126 (0.129)   
Ireland*grpr - -0.035 (0.131)   
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Finland*grpr - 0.061 (0.126)   
Austria*grpr - 0.133 (0.148)   
Belgium*grpr - 0.088 (0.132)   
Control for subsidiary Yes Yes   
Controls for reporter Yes Yes   
2R  0.39 0.43   
Number observations 1045 1045   
Note: In the table each column shows coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.  
Coefficients in bold denote significance at 10% level or better.  Industry dummies are 
included in all regressions but results are not reported.  Reference country is the UK and 
reference industry is manufacturing.  
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Table 4a Analysis of labour extraction function: absenteeism 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
w 0.009 (0.012) 0.008 (0.012) 0.006 (0.012) 0.007 (0.013) 
s -0.035 (0.027) -0.056 (0.029) -0.054 (0.029) -0.058 (0.030) 
lfsize 0.423 (0.194) 0.370 (0.204) 0.458 (0.211) 0.402 (0.214) 
lfage -0.029 (0.265) -0.218 (0.268) -0.195 (0.269) -0.123 (0.274) 
eage45 0.039 (0.012) 0.039 (0.012) 0.040 (0.013) 0.036 (0.013) 
eedugr -0.030 (0.009) -0.025 (0.009) -0.024 (0.009) -0.023 (0.009) 
market -0.234 (0.340) -0.133 (0.336) -0.094 (0.337) -0.111 (0.342) 
calc - - -0.042 (0.104) -0.027 (0.253) 
coll - - -0.172 (0.103) -0.114 (0.360) 
grpr - - -0.200 (0.108) -0.068 (0.242) 
France - 3.159 (1.048) 3.354 (1.100) 4.583 (2.801) 
Germany - 2.262 (0.821) 2.022 (0.842) 3.341 (2.569) 
Sweden - 6.043 (1.354) 6.037 (1.358) 6.308 (4.023) 
Spain - 2.374 (1.098) 1.983 (1.120) 3.820 (2.507) 
Denmark - -1.842 (1.074) -1.914 (1.093) -1.835 (1.330) 
Norway - 3.046 (0.846) 3.028 (0.877) 2.377 (2.669) 
Ireland - 0.251 (0.969) 0.116 (0.981) 0.695 (1.118) 
Finland - -1.335 (0.928) -1.186 (0.950) -2.396 (2.339) 
Austria - 2.683 (1.114) 2.502 (1.118) 4.926 (2.181) 
Belgium - 0.060 (0.203) -0.020 (0.205) 1.440 (2.064) 
France*calc - - - -0.478 (0.430) 
Germany*calc - - - -0.030 (0.077) 
Sweden*calc - - - 1.111 (0.780) 
Spain*calc - - - -0.695 (0.562) 
Denmark*calc - - - 0.224 (0.477) 
Norway*calc - - - 0.191 (0.358) 
Ireland*calc - - - 0.095 (0.212) 
Finland*calc - - - 0.523 (0.407) 
Austria*calc - - - -0.206 (0.511) 
Belgium*calc - - - -0.080 (0.525) 
France*coll - - - -0.014 (0.087) 
Germany*coll - - - -0.397 (0.218) 
Sweden*coll - - - -1.153 (0.703) 
Spain*coll - - - 0.092 (0.590) 
Denmark*coll - - - -0.270 (0.137) 
Norway*coll - - - -0.739 (0.532) 
Ireland*coll - - - -0.260 (0.412) 
Finland*coll - - - -0.326 (0.324) 
Austria*coll - - - -1.326 (0.705) 
Belgium*coll - - - -0.253 (0.347) 
France*grpr - - - -0.116 (0.099) 
Germany*grpr - - - -0.056 (0.117) 
Sweden*grpr - - - -2.146 (0.572) 
Spain*grpr - - - 0.351 (0.837) 
Denmark*grpr - - - -0.141 (0.076) 
Norway*grpr - - - -0.372 (0.210) 
Ireland*grpr - - - -0.002 (0.159) 
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Finland*grpr - - - -0.585 (0.349) 
Austria*grpr - - - -0.174 (0.186) 
Belgium*grpr - - - -0.034 (0.074) 
Control for subsidiary Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2R  0.23 0.30 0.34 0.41 
Number observations 779 779 779 779 
Note: In the table each column shows coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.  
Coefficients in bold denote significance at 10% level or better.  Industry dummies are 
included in all regressions but results are not reported.  Reference country is the UK and 
reference industry is manufacturing.  
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Table 4b Analysis of labour extraction function: turnover 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
w 0.032 (0.016) 0.016 (0.017) 0.016 (0.017) 0.016 (0.017) 
s 0.095 (0.040) 0.045 (0.044) 0.036 (0.044) 0.050 (0.045) 
lfsize 0.432 (0.255) 0.264 (0.290) 0.295 (0.300) 0.296 (0.302) 
lfage -1.505 (0.378) -1.098 (0.379) -0.996 (0.380) -0.919 (0.385) 
eage45 -0.075 (0.018) -0.080 (0.018) -0.076 (0.018) -0.082 (0.018) 
eedugr -0.019 (0.012) -0.027 (0.012) -0.027 (0.013) -0.028 (0.013) 
market 0.766 (0.482) 0.698 (0.472) 0.718 (0.473) 0.651 (0.479) 
calc - - -0.128 (0.094) -0.138 (0.386) 
coll - - -0.394 (0.151) -0.658 (0.536) 
grpr - - -0.315 (0.183) -0.622 (0.364) 
France - -7.178 (1.484) -6.780 (1.542) -2.209 (3.394) 
Germany - -8.239 (1.227) -8.133 (1.252) -9.006 (3.808) 
Sweden - -8.064 (1.700) -8.342 (1.703) -8.996 (7.491) 
Spain - -5.269 (1.672) -5.639 (1.697) -2.591 (3.609) 
Denmark - -3.951 (1.495) -3.656 (1.518) -6.549 (3.952) 
Norway - -6.720 (1.244) -6.139 (1.278) -8.298 (3.927) 
Ireland - -5.879 (1.380) -5.785 (1.390) -8.737 (4.318) 
Finland - -7.712 (1.358) -7.323 (1.377) -6.735 (4.719) 
Austria - -7.847 (1.628) -7.393 (1.634) -9.596 (5.145) 
Belgium - -7.558 (1.629) -7.899 (1.630) -9.689 (5.131) 
France*calc - - - -0.570 (0.640) 
Germany*calc - - - 0.7757 (0.560) 
Sweden*calc - - - 0.537 (0.836) 
Spain*calc - - - -0.839 (0.885) 
Denmark*calc - - - 1.182 (0.661) 
Norway*calc - - - 0.248 (0.539) 
Ireland*calc - - - 0.862 (0.604) 
Finland*calc - - - 1.488 (0.590) 
Austria*calc - - - 0.813 (0.424) 
Belgium*calc - - - 0.773 (0.355) 
France*coll - - - -1.790 (0.938) 
Germany*coll - - - -0.824 (0.497) 
Sweden*coll - - - -0.732 (0.442) 
Spain*coll - - - -1.921 (1.233) 
Denmark*coll - - - -1.277 (0.729) 
Norway*coll - - - -0.157 (0.591) 
Ireland*coll - - - -0.999 (0.855) 
Finland*coll - - - -1.618 (0.904) 
Austria*coll - - - -0.638 (1.205) 
Belgium*coll - - - -0.351 (0.974) 
France*grpr - - - -0.280 (0.733) 
Germany*grpr - - - -0.041 (0.420) 
Sweden*grpr - - - 0.258 (0.745) 
Spain*grpr - - - 1.712 (1.008) 
Denmark*grpr - - - -1.429 (1.090) 
Norway*grpr - - - -0.215 (0.664) 
Ireland*grpr - - - 1.234 (0.622) 
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Finland*grpr - - - -0.138 (0.595) 
Austria*grpr - - - 0.366 (0.858) 
Belgium*grpr - - - -0.250 (1.013) 
Control for subsidiary Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2R  0.25 0.32 0.36 0.42 
Number observations 965 965 965 965 
Note: In the table each column shows coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.  
Coefficients in bold denote significance at 10% level or better.  Industry dummies are 
included in all regressions but results are not reported.  Reference country is the UK and 
reference industry is manufacturing.  
 
